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Abstract. This paper is part of the research on the interlinkages be-
tween insurers and their contribution to systemic risk on the insurance
market. Its main purpose is to present the results of the analysis of link-
age dynamics and systemic risk in the European insurance sector which
are obtained using correlation networks. These networks are based on
dynamic dependence structures modelled using a copula. Then, we de-
termine minimum spanning trees (MST). Finally, the linkage dynamics
is described by means of selected topological network measures.
1. Introduction
This article is devoted to the dynamics of the interconnectedness of some
among the largest European insurers. Our main tool are the minimum
spanning trees. The results obtained are presented in the context of systemic
risk on the European insurance market. It should be pointed out that after
the financial crisis during the years 2007-2009 and the European public debt
crisis during the period 2010-2012, both the academic community and the
supervisory authorities have started to pay more attention to the role played
by insurance institutions in creating systemic risk. Before that, researchers
seemed to be convinced that the insurance market is systemically irrelevant.
After the crisis, some of them upheld their point of view: [11], [3], [10], [2],
while others published papers indicating that systemic risk may be created
by the insurance sector: [5], [26],[1], [7], [6], [8]. In [4] basing on the study
of a large number of insurers in a long timescale, the authors come to the
conclusion that the contribution of the insurance sector to systemic risk is
relatively small and its peak was reached during the financial crisis of the
years 2007-2008. They also indicate the four L’s: linkages between large
insurance companies, leverage, losses, liquidity, as important factors for the
insurers’ exposure to systemic risk.
After the crisis, the supervisory authorities, too, reached the conclusion
that systemic risk may be generated on the insurance market. As a result
they developed a method allowing to distinguish the insurance institutions
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that have a particular impact on financial stability1. This method takes
into account the following five dimensions cf. [12]2:
• the size of the insurance institution (5%),
• its range of activities of global character (5%),
• assessment of the degree of direct and indirect linkages between in-
stitutions in the financial system (40%),
• non-traditional activities of the insurer outside the insurance sector
(45%),
• product substitutability - the institution’s significance grows to-
gether with the lack of real possibilities of substitution for the ser-
vices rendered by the insurer (5%).
Therefore, we can say that both theoreticians and practitioners are con-
vinced that insurance institutions have a potential of creating systemic risk
and that the interconnectedness of insurance companies is one of the major
factors influencing risk exposure.
The report [9] indicates that in order to assess potential systemic risk
one needs to consider the build-up of risks, including the risks that are
built up over time, as well as the interconnectedness within the financial
sector and the wider economy. In the same report it was remarked that
linkages in the insurance sector and between the latter and other parts of
the financial sector, most notably the banking one, need to be addressed and
analyzed. Our present article is an attempt to respond to these challenges.
We concentrate on the study of the dynamics of the interconnectedness
structure of the insurers in the propagation of systemic risk on the insurance
market. This dynamics has been studied using properly chosen topological
indices of minimum spanning trees built using conditional correlations of
returns of European insurers. Indeed, we believe that a higher correlation
of insurers’ stock prices implies that more insurers are exposed to the same
kind of turmoil at the same time and they will tend to react more similarly
when hit by a shock.
The contribution of our article is two-fold. Firstly, it is the application of
two-dimensional copula-DCC-GARCH models to estimate the conditional
correlation coefficients, crucial for the analysis. Secondly, we present the
result of the analysis of the interconnectedness structure dynamics in the
European insurance sector obtained using selected topological indicators for
minimum spanning trees and we check, if during high turbulence periods on
the financial market the network’s structure is different from the structure
observed during the periods when the market was in its ‘normal state’. To
1This list is published by FSB (Financial Stability Board) (see
https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/policy-development/addressing-sifis/
global-systemically-important-financial-institutions-g-sifis/). Currently it
consists of: Aegon, Allianz, AIG, Aviva, AXA, MetLife, Ping An Insurance (Group)
Company of China, Prudential Financial Inc., Prudential plc.
2The brackets contain the weight associated to each quantity when computing in the
general index.
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the best of our knowledge, this approach is novel and has not been used in
the literature yet.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second chapter we discuss briefly
the topological indicators or indices we shall be using. In the third — we
present the empirical strategy, while the fourth one is devoted to the data
and the results obtained. Finally, we draw our conclusions in the fifth and
last chapter.
2. Methodology — topological indices of networks
One of the newest mainstreams of research in interconnectedness on the
insurance market makes use of graph theory. The Minimum Spanning Tree,
which we will abbreviate MST, is a major tool taken from this theory. The
MSTs are widely used due to their good filtering and compression properties
in the case of complex systems having a network structure, which simplifies
the description and analysis of the processes that take place, see [14], [15].
At the same time, in order to study the structure of the network of linkages
when this structure evolves in time, researchers avail themselves of time
series of adequate topological indices of the network found thanks to the
MST constructed for each period studied. In practice, the most used time
series involve the following indices:
• The Average Path Length – APL. This index is defined as the av-
erage number of steps taken along all the shortest paths connecting
all possible pairs of network nodes. It measures the effectivity of
information flow or mass transport of a network. The APL is one
of the most robust measures of network topology (alongside with
the clustering coefficient and the degree distribution). It is clear
that APL will tell an easily negotiable network from an inefficient
or complex one. However, although the smaller the APL, the better
the diffusion of information, we should keep in mind that as we use
an average quantity, we can get a small APL also for a network that
has several very distant nodes and many neighbouring ones.
If we consider a network as an unweighted directed graph with a
set of n > 1 vertices V and put δ(u, v) for the length of the shortest
path connecting the two distinct vertices u, v (with the convention
that it reduces to zero in case they cannot be connected), then the
APL is given by the formula
1
n(n− 1)
∑
u,v∈V : u6=v
δ(u, v).
• The Maximum Degree: in graph theory it is defined as the maximal
number of edges coming out from a vertex (where each loop counts
for two). In other words, it measures the number of connections to
the central vertex.
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• The Betweenness Centrality – abbreviated BC. It measures the cen-
trality of a vertex: we consider the ratio between the number of short-
est paths connecting two vertices and passing through the given one,
and the number of all the shortest paths between pairs of distinct
vertices. It indicates thus the most important nodes of a network
based on shortest paths (e.g. the most influential insurer). For each
pair of vertices of a connected graph there always exists at least one
path connecting them and such that either the number of edges it
passes through (for unweighted graphs), or the sum of the weights
(for weighted graphs) is minimized. In plain words, BC gives the
number of the shortest paths passing through a fixed vertex and
therefore it specifies to what extent a given node serves as an inter-
mediary for other nodes of the network. In particular, a node with
high BC has more control over the network.
• The parameter α from the degree distribution required to follow
(asymptotically) a power law – i.e. it concerns scale-free networks.
This parameter measures the scale-free behaviour of the network. To
be more precise, if we denote by P (k) = nk
n
the degree distribution
where nk is the number of vertices of the graph having degree k
and n the total number of vertices, then we require that P (k) ∼
Ck−α, where α > 0 is a parameter specific to the given network.
The power law followed by P (k) results in the network having some
(fractal) self-similarity properties which accounts for the name scale-
free. Such networks have typically a small number of nodes having
many connections (such nodes are called hubs) and a large number
of nodes with only a single connection. From the point of view of
our analysis this kind of network is considered as favorable to the
diffusion of information (systemic risk) and the hubs it contains are
systemically relevant.
We should add that in the literature MSTs that evolve in time are monitored
also through many other topological indices such as e.g. the normalized tree
length, the mean occupation layer, the tree half-life [20]; survival ratio of
the edges [21], [23]; node degree, strength [23]; eigenvector [24]; closeness
centrality [23] and agglomerative coefficient [17].
3. Empiric strategy
The empiric strategy we use in the present paper consists essentially of
two stages:
• first we construct the minimum spanning tree MSTt for each period
t = 1, . . . , T under consideration;
• then, using MSTt we define the time series of the chosen topological
indices of the network.
The first stage is based on the usual procedure well-known from the litera-
ture (cf. [16] and the references therein):
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(1) We determine the logarithmic return rates ri,t, i = 1, . . . , k, t =
1, . . . , T , based on the stock quotes of k insurers.
(2) Using the logarithmic return rates ri,t we estimate the conditional
linear correlation coefficients Rt(i, j) for each pair of insurers (i, j)
i, j = 1, . . . , k and each period t = 1, . . . , T .
(3) For each period we determine the matrix of distances between the
insurers, making use of the following metric from [14]:
dt(i, j) =
√
2(1−Rt(i, j))
where Rt(i, j) is the correlation coefficient between the i-th and j-th
insurers, i, j = 1, . . . , k, for t = 1, . . . , T .
(4) Next, using the distance matrices we construct the minimum span-
ning trees MSTt (t = 1, . . . , T ) with k vertices and k − 1 edges,
thanks to the Kruskal algorithm, cf. [15]. The obtained graph MSTt
is a model of the network of connections between insurers for the
period t. Its vertices represent the different insurers, whereas the
edges connect those pairs of them that share the most of similarities
(connection with an edge means that the distance, as defined above,
between the two vertices is relatively small). In some sense, this con-
struction amounts to finding the most convenient k− 1 connections
among all the k(k − 1)/2 connections available. In the case that we
analyze, the MSTt’s can be seen as filtered networks that allow the
identification of the most probable and the shortest path of crisis
transmission (of systemic risk).
The correlation coefficients Rt(i, j), crucial for that procedure, are ob-
tained using two-dimensional copula-DCC-GARCH models estimated for
each pair of insurers. To the authors’ best knowledge, this approach has
never been applied to construct dynamic minimum spanning trees before.
In the copula-DCC-GARCH model, the distribution of the vector rt =
(r1,t, . . . , rk,t) of return rates, conditional w.r.t. the set Ωt−1 of information
available up to the time period t−1, is modeled using the conditional copulæ
proposed by Patton in [22]. It takes the following form:
r1,t|Ωt−1 ∼ F1,t(· | Ωt−1), . . . , rk,t|Ωt−1 ∼ Fk,t(· | Ωt−1)
rt|Ωt−1 ∼ Ft(· | Ωt−1)
Ft(rt | Ωt−1) = Ct(F1,t(r1,t | Ωt−1), . . . , Fk,t(rk,t | Ωt−1))
where Ct stands for the copula, while Ft and Fi,t denote the distribution
function of the multivariate distribution and the the distribution function of
the marginal distributions at time t, respectively. In the general case, one-
dimensional return rates can be modeled using various specifications of the
mean model (e.g. the ARIMA process) as well as various specifications of the
variance model (e.g. sGARCH, fGARCH, eGARCH, gjrGARCH, apARCH,
iGARCH, csGARCH). In our study, we used the following ARIMA process
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for all the average return rates series:
ri,t = µi,t + yi,t,
µi,t = E(ri,t | Ωt−1),
µi,t = µi,0 +
pi∑
j=1
ϕijri,t−j +
qi∑
j=1
θijyi,t−j,
yi,t =
√
hi,tεi,t,
whereas for the variance we applied the exponential GARCH (eGARCH)
[18]:
log(hi,t) = ωi +
pi∑
j=1
(αijεi,t−j + γij(|εi,t−j| − E|εi,t−j|)) +
qi∑
j=1
βij log(hi,t−j)
where εi,t =
yi,t√
hi,t
are identically distributed independent random variables
(in the empirical study we consider the normal distribution, the skew normal
distribution, t-Student, skew t-Student and GED).
In order to describe the dependances between reutrn rates we use t-
Student copulæ with the conditional correlations Rt obtained from the
model DCC(m,n) as parameters:
Ht = DtRtDt,
Dt = diag(
√
h1,t, . . . ,
√
hk,t),
Rt = (diag(Qt))
−1/2Qt (diag(Qt))
−1/2 ,
Qt =
(
1−
m∑
j=1
cj −
n∑
j=1
dj
)
Q¯+
m∑
j=1
cj(εt−jε′t−j) +
n∑
j=1
djQt−j.
Here Q¯ is the unconditional covariance matrix of the standardized residuals
εt, cj (j = 1, . . . ,m) are scalars describing the influence of precedent shocks
on the current correlations while the scalars dj (j = 1, . . . , n) represent the
influence of the precedent conditional correlations.
In the second stage we determine, using the minimum spanning trees
MSTt obtained, the time series for the following topological network indices:
• the average path length APL,
• the maximum degree,
• the parameters α of the power law of the degree distribution,
• the betweenness centrality BC.
4. Data and analysis results
As a a basis for our study we took the stock quotes of 28 European in-
surance institutions chosen among 50 largest such institutions3 according to
3From the 50 largest we chose the companies that were listed during the period studied
i.e. 07.01.2005-26.04.2019.
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https://www.relbanks.com/top-insurance-companies/europe (see Ta-
ble 1). We analyzed weekly logarithmic return rates for the time period
from January 7th 2005 to April 26th 2019.
No. Insurer Abbreviation Country Total as-
sets in bil.
USD (bal-
ance sheet
12/31/2016)
Place
in the
rank-
ing
1 AXA AXA France 944,145 1
2 Allianz Alli Germany 934,654 2
3 Prudential plc Prud Great Britain 578,149 3
4 Legal & General Lega Great Britain 574,901 4
5 Generali Gene Italy 551,168 5
6 Aviva Aviv Great Britain 541,188 6
7 Aegon Aego Netherlands 450,439 7
8 CNP Assurances CNP France 443,242 8
9 Zurich Insurance Zuri Switzerland 382,679 9
10 Munich Re Mu.Re Germany 283,206 10
11 Old Mutual Ol.Mu Great Britain 210,823 13
12 Swiss Life Swiss Switzerland 196,373 14
13 Chubb Ltd Chub Switzerland 159,786 17
14 Ageas Agea Belgium 110,294 19
15 Phoenix Phoen Great Britain 105,676 20
16 Unipol Gruppo Unip Italy 97,184 23
17 Mapfre Mapf Spain 71,787 26
18 Hannover Re Hann Germany 67,184 28
19 Storebrand Stor Norway 60,508 29
20 XL.Group XL.Gr Bermuda 58,434 30
21 Helvetia Holding Helv Switzerland 54,299 31
22 Vienna Insurance Vien Austria 52,981 32
23 SCOR SE SCOR France 45,784 33
24 Mediolanum Medi Italy 44,386 34
25 Sampo Oyj Samp Finland 40,139 35
26 RSA Insurance Group RSA Great Britain 25,976 39
27 Societa` Cattolica di Assicurazione So.Ca Italy 25,627 40
28 Topdanmark A/S Topd Denmark 10,451 47
Table 1: Insurance companies considered in the study and their abbreviations
used in the presentation of the results. (Source: authors’ own elaboration based
on https://www.relbanks.com/top-insurance-companies/europe.)
Proceeding to construct the minimum spanning tree, we computed the
correlation coefficientsRt(i, j) from the two-dimensional copula-DCC-GARCH
models estimates for each pair of insurers. During this analysis we used dif-
ferent specifications ARMA-GARCH of one-dimensional models. Eventu-
ally, basing on information criteria and adequacy tests, we chose for all the
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returns the ARMA(1,1)-eGARCH(2,2) model with the skew t-Student dis-
tribution. In the analysis of the dependances’ dynamics we considered the
Gauss and Student Copulæ togehter with various specifications of the DCC
model. As earlier, from information criteria we chose the Student copula
with correlation conditionals obtained from the DCC(1,1) model and a con-
stant shape parameter (estimation results for all the 372 models available on
demand). On the basis of the correlation coefficients obtained in this way
for each period t = 1, . . . , 747 studied we determined the distance matrices.
Then, using the Kruskal algorithm, we constructed the minimum spanning
tree. Four such trees for the beginning and the end of two periods when the
network was shrinking (clear drop in the APL), i.e. 02.06.2006–17.08.2007
and 05.12.2008–17.09.2010, can be seen on Figure 1.
Figure 1. Minimum spanning trees in the beginning and at
the end of two periods when the network was shrinking, i.e.
02.06.2006-17.08.2007 and 05.12.2008-17.09.2010. (Source: au-
thors’ own elaboration.)
In the second stage the miminum spanning trees obtained were used to
determine the time series for: the average path legth (Fig. 2), the maximum
degree (Fig. 3), the parameters α of the power law of the degree distribu-
tion and the corresponding values of pValue (Fig. 4) and the betweeness
centrality. The average values of BC for the studied period 07.01.2005–
26.04.2019 obtained for the different insurers is shown on Fig. 5. Finally,
Figure 6 presents the BC times series only for selected insurers, i.e. for the
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two having the highest, lowest and ‘average’ mean values of the indicator.
The highest values 0, 709 and 0, 549 were obtained for AXA and Allianz,
respectively, the lowest (0,000) – for Phoenix, Chubb Ltd and XL.Group,
and the ‘average’ mean value of BC is represented by Munich Re.
Figure 2. Average path length for minimum spanning trees dur-
ing the period studied (07.01.2005-26.04.2019). (Source: authors’
own elaboration.)
Figure 3. Maximum degrees for minimum spanning trees dur-
ing the period studied (07.01.2005-26.04.2019). (Source: authors’
own elaboration.)
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Figure 4. Estimated parameters α of the power law and the
corresponding values pValue for the MST during the period stud-
ied (07.01.2005-26.04.2019). (Source: authors’ own elaboration.)
Figure 5. Mean value of BC during the period studied
07.01.2005-26.04.2019 for each insurer. (Source: authors’ own
elaboration.)
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Figure 6. BC of selected insurance companies (i.e. AXA, Mu-
nich Re and Phoenix) during the period studied (07.01.2005-
26.04.2019). (Source: authors’ own elaboration.)
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5. Conclusions
Our aim was to study the dependance and linkage structure, together
with its dynamics during the period 07.01.2005–26.04.2019 enclosing the
financial crisis of the years 2007–2009 as well as the European public debt
crisis of 2010–2012, in the case of the largest European insurance com-
panies and making use of the minimum spanning trees. The correlation
coefficients, crucial for the analysis made, were obtained using the esti-
mated two-dimensional copula-DCC-GARCH models, whilst the minimum
spanning trees were constructed by means of the Kruskal algorithm. The
dependance structure dynamics was studied with the aid of time series for
suitably chosen topological indices of the network.
The results lead to the conclusion that the analyzed time series of the
topological indices for the minimum spanning trees MSTt (t = 1, . . . , T )
constructed using the distances obtained from the dynamical correlations,
do not show any trend, but at the same time they show a significant vari-
ability.
Looking on the average path length and the maximum degree (cf. Figures
2 and 3) we can determine the periods during which these two indicators are
clearly below the average (shown as the dotted line on the two figures), and
the periods during which their values are distinctly above average. More-
over, it is apparent that a drop in the APL goes together with a soar of the
maximum degree. When the mean distance tends to get smaller, it signal-
izes a shrinking of the dependances network, i.e. an uplift of the interdepen-
dances between the insurance companies which implies also a higher ability
of information transfer. A clear shrinking of the network can be seen for the
period 02.06.2006–17.08.2007, i.e. precisely just before the subprime crisis
and during its first phase4, as well as for the period 05.12.2008–17.09.2010,
i.e. just before and at the very beginnning of the European public debt cri-
sis. The minimum spanning trees at the beginning and at the end of these
two periods are shown on Fig. 1 (MST A, MST B, MST C, MST D, respec-
tively). On that basis, analyzing the minimum spanning trees structure for
the remaining weeks (the corresponding results are available on demand)
we can come to the conclusion that during the time of the largest turbu-
lences on global markets, the average distance for the trees is low, while
their degree is high. In this kind of trees we can distinguish several crucial
insurance companies with a high value of betweenness centrality, i.e. having
an important control over the network. As it is apparent from the graphics
shown on Fig. 6, during the subprime crisis, the network was controlled
essentially by AXA alone, whereas during the European public debt crisis,
Allianz took over the control. In general, we can also remark that during
the period studied, these are the two companies that gain in turn control
over the network.
4The crisis phases and the developmentsl inked to them are described in details in
[10], Appendix A. Timeline of crisis.
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On the other hand, from the analysis of the time series for the parameters
α and the corresponding values pValue we can see that in each period stud-
ied the degree distribution of MSTt follows a power law (see Fig. 4), i.e.
the networks are scale-free. Typically, such networks have a small number
of vertices with a large number of edges starting from them — these are the
hubs — and many vertices with only one edge. From our point of view, this
kind of network is seen as ‘favourable’ to the propagation of information
(systemic risk) and the companies-hubs are systemically relevant.
In conclusion, we can claim that the scale-free character of the network of
relations between the insurers, observed in each period under study, favours
the propagation of potential systemic risk in the European insurance sector
for which our source is the G-SIIs list of companies. Moreover, due to
the shrinkage of the networks during the periods of strong turbulences on
financial markets, the ability to propagate significantly increases.
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